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STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
TAXABLE INCOME. CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS
Most judicial thought regarding the problem of whether a cancellation of
indebtedness is to be recorded as income or as a gift to the debtor is traceable to
tile landmark opinion of the Supreme Court in United States v. Kirby Lumber
Company, decided in 1981.' The Court there held that the discharge of bonds
by payment of less than the face amount of the obligations resulted in taxable in-
come to the issuing corporation in the year of cancellation. This decision coming
at the depth of a great depression, resulted in considerable confusion as to the
income tax consequences of cancellation of indebtedness, and placed a heavy
burden on corporations seeking to adjust their capital structures. The generally
lower market price of securities made the problem significant to every debtor who
contemplated improving his balance sheet by purchase and retirement of his own
securities, thereby reducing his current interest obligations so as to avert possible
bankruptcy. Courts deciding cases of this nature were torn between the Kirby
decision as precedent, and the precarious financial condition of many of the liti-
gants. As a result, the evolution of legal doctrines in this field was inextricably
interwoven with the economics of the depression era, and in order to prevent
hardship in particular cases several exceptions were developed to the rule of the
Kirby case.'
One of these exceptions,-wlhere the cancellation of indebtedness is deemed to
bc a gift from the creditor to the debtor-was strengthened, if not established, by
the Supreme Court in Helvermng v. American Dental Company.' In that case, the
ta\payer, a corporation, owed certain past due bills for merchandise. The in-
debtedness was represented by interest-bearing notes. Interest had been deducted
for several years in the taxpayer s income tax returns. The corporation also owed
several years back rent which had been accrued as an expense. The taxpayer
negotiated an agreement with his creditors whereby he agreed to pay part of the
debts and agreed to cancel the remainder. By virtue of this arrangement, the
corporation credited the total amount of the cancelled debts to earned surplus,
but did not report any of the sum as taxable income. The Commissioner thereupon
increased the taxpayer s income to the extent that the items of indebtedness had
been used as deductions to offset income in like amounts in prior years.
The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the Commissioner s determination of a
deficiency. The argument of the taxpayer that the cancellations were exempt gifts
was answered by an opinion of the Board that, "No evidence was introduced to
show a donative intent upon the part of any creditor. The evidence indicates, on
the contrary, that the creditors acted for purely business reasons and did not for-
give the debts for altruistic reasons or out of pure generosity."'
The court of appeals reversed the Board on the ground that the cancella-
tions were not income but gifts, and the Supreme Court agreed.- Discussing sec-
tion 22 (a), defimng gross income for tax purposes, and section 22 (b) (3), de-
'284 U. S. 1, 76 L. Ed. 131, 52 Sup. Ct. 4 (1931).
For an excellent article setting out the exceptions in full see, LYNCH, Some Tax
Effects of Cancellation of Indebtedness, 13 FoRD. L. REv. 145 (1944).
3318 U. S. 322. 87 L. Ed. 785, 63 Sup. Ct. 577 (1942).
'44 B. T A. 425, 428 (1941).
- 128 F. 2d 254 (C. C. A. 7th 1942), 318 U. S. 322 (1942).
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scribing the exclusion of gifts, bequests -aid devises,6 the Court observed that the
Treasury Regulation 94, relating to the Revenue Act of 1936, Art. 22 (a) -14,
which covered cancellations of indebtedness, had made a change in the Treasury s
concept of the tax effect of debt forgiveness. In the previous regulation the
Treasury expressly recogmzed the situation where a creditor who desired to bene-
fit his debtor canceled the debt without consideration, and it was held that the
amount of the debt would be a gift not required to be included in the debtor s
gross income. The new regulation, however, made no such express recognition
of the "gift concept" of cancellation of indebtedness. In fact, it seemed to
repudiate the idea by not only leaving it out of the new regulation, but also by
expressly stating that, "A taxpayer realizes income by the payment or purchase
of his obligations at less than their face value."8 Although it seems that the regula-
tion would have a direct bearing on the case, the Supreme Court merely observed
that the Treasury s policies had changed, and went on into a discussion of cases
related to the problem at hand. This discussion served to illustrate that the cases
on the subject of cancellation of indebtedness were confusing and that legislation
had been invoked in an effort to clarify the problem, but that none of this legisla-
tion was applicable to the case at hand. It was in this manner that the Supreme
Court reached its decision that the case was to be governed by section 22 (b) (3)
which exempts gifts from gross income. The word "gifts" was " a generic
word of broad connotation, taking coloration from the context of the particular
statute in which it may appear. Its plain meaning in its present setting denotes,
it seems to us, the receipt of financial advantages gratuitouslv."'
The Court disagreed with the Board of Tax Appeals position that the can-
cellation of indebtedness, in this case, was not a gift. It was impressed by the
fact that there was a personal relationship in the dealings between creditor and
debtor in effecting these cancellations; and the fact that the motives were those
of business or even selfish was not material. The release was a gratuitous for-
giveness of debt-something from the creditor to the debtor for nothing-and suffi-
cient to make the cancellations gifts within the meaning of the statute.
The only distinction between the Dental case and the Kirby case seems to be
in the fact that in the former the parties did not deal in an "arms-length transac-
tion," while in the latter the debt reduction was accomplished by transactions on
the open market and not personally between the debtor and the creditor. With
this in mind, along with the fact that in the Dental case the Court was of opinion
that the motives leading a creditor to cancel his debtor s indebtedness were im-
material, it will be interesting to turn to a very recent case decided by the Supreme
Court wlhch was very similar on its facts to both the Kirby and the Dental cases.
Commissioner v. Jacobson, decided by the Supreme Court on January 17,
1949, involved the cancellation of indebtedness represented by mortgage bonds."
The taxpayer borrowed a sum of money from his bank to be used for the purchase
of a building. He issued 200 bonds secured by a mortgage trust deed on the
0 Id. at 325.
-Id. at 326 and n. 5.8 Id. at 326 and n. 4 [The current regulation which concerns this point is Treas.
Reg. 111, sec. 29.22(a)-17 (1949).]
Old. at 330.
- 336 U. S. 28, 93 L. Ed. 297 69 Sup. Ct. 358 (1949).
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property and the bonds were sold to various holders, the bank acting as trustee
for the bond-holders. The bank failed on June 8, 1931 and a bondholders comn-
mittee was forned for the bondholders who had purchased bonds on taxpayer s
building. Depression of real estate values caused the bond prices to drop. Al-
though several extensions had been granted for the payment of the principal, the
taxpayer had managed to pay the interest and retire some of the bonds as their due
dates fell. At this time the petitioner decided to repurchase the bonds, at their
depreciated values and succeeded in doing so, thereby cancelling is indebtedness
for approximately half of what he had received for the bonds. The bonds were
bought in two different ways: some were secured through direct negotiation with
the owners of the bonds; while others were purchased indirectly through the secre-
tarv of the bondholders committee, and still others through the facilities of a bond
broker, the taxpayer paying a commission to the broker on each sale.
The "gain" accomplished by virtue of the cancellation of indebtedness was
denominated as income by the Commissioner and petitioner was charged with
deficiencies in his income tax payments.
The Tax Court decided that the bonds repurchased through direct
negotiations with the bondholders came directly within the rule laid down
in the Dental case, due to the personal relationship involved, and therefore the
increase in petitioner s assets from such dealings was a gift and non-taxable as
income. As to those bonds repurchased indirectly, the Tax Court was of the
opinion that the Kirby case rule would apply, because of the personal element
thought necessary to make a gift within the meaing of the Dental case was
absent."
It is worth noting that six members of the Tax Court differed with the ma-
jority holding in this case. The majority had turned the case on the distinction
between petitioner s dealings personally with the bondholders and his negotiations
to purchase bonds through internedianes. The dissent declared that this was
error and that the proper criterion to distinguish the Kirby case from the American
Dental Co. case was whether the acquisition of these bonds by petitioner at prices
below their face value occurred under such circumstances that it might be said
the forgiveness of the excess of the face value over the price paid was actually
gratuitous and sufficient to make the cancellations in this case gifts within the
statute. The dissent concluded that the cancellations, in this case, were not gifts,
on the familiar contract theory that a part payment of a debt before it is due con-
stitutes consideration which Nill support a promise of the creditor to waive or
forgive the balance of the debt. Here the bonds were paid before their maturity
dates, a fact which constituted the analogy utilized by the dissent in arriving at
their determination that the cancellations were not gifts because given for valid
consideration."'
On appeal to the court of appeals, the Tax Court decision was affirmed in
part, and in part reversed." As to the bonds purchased by the taxpayer directly
from the bondholders, the court was of the view that such purchases came squarely
within the rationale of the Dental case, and that the difference between the face
-16 T C. 1048 (1946).L"Id. at 1058.
13 164 F. 2d 594 (C. C. A. 7th 1947).
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value of such bonds and the purchase pnce paid bv the taxpayer did not represent
taxable gain. The reversal in part, relating to the bonds purchased indirectly, was
occasioned by a different view of the basis of the Dental Co. decision. The Court
of Appeals was of the opinion that the personal relation of the parties in that case
was not the important, or certainly not the controlling element. The turmng point
in that decision was, in the opinion of the court, that the creditors parted with
their securities at less than their face value with knowledge that the amount re-
ceived was in discharge of the debtor s obligation. Therefore, the court con-
cluded, it is immatenal that the taxpayer, as to the purchase of some bonds, dealt
with his creditors through an agent rather than in a face to face transaction, be-
cause the facts in the case were plain to show that in every sale the creditor knew
that the agent with whom he dealt was purchasing the bonds for the debtor. In
this, as well as direct negotiations, the objective sought and the results accom-
plished were held to be the same-a gratuitous forgiveness, and a release of some-
thing to the debtor for nothing.
The case was presented to the Supreme Court and it reviewed the facts and
sustained the theory of the court of appeals that there could be no valid distinction
between the sales made directly to the taxpayer and those made through agents,
who the bondholders knew were purchasing for the debtor."' However, the
Supreme Court noted that the lower court had, without any finding of intent by
the respective sellers to transfer or release something for nothing, as distinguished
from an intent to get the highest available price for their claims, treated the tax-
payer s gain as exempt from taxation because it felt itself obliged to classify each
such gain as a "gift", and therefore non-taxable. Denominating this error, the
Court reversed the decision. In justifying this action the Court used two argu-
mients:
(1) The nature of the transactions in this case were not what would ordinarily
indicate a gift from the creditor to the debtor of part of the indebtedness repre-
sentative by the bonds. In other words the Court thought:
"It is conceivable, althoug hardly likely, that a bondholder,
in the ordinary course of business and without any express release of
his debtor, might have sold part of his claims on the bonds ie held at
the full face value of those parts and then have made a gift of the rest
of his claims on those bonds to the same debtor 'for nothing It is
that kind of extraordinary transaction that the respondent asks us, as
a matter of law, to read into the simple sales which actually took place
and from which he derived financial gains."15
Therefore, on the factual basis, the Court held the gain not to be a gift,
but income.
The American Dental Co. case was distinguished on the ground that a credi-
tor would be "more likely" to transfer or release part of his claim for cash and
the balance for nothing in connection with a release of an open account for rent
or for interest, than he would in the sale of outstanding securities of a corporation
or a private person."
(2) The Supreme Court's second reason for not viewing these transactions as
"See note 10 supra.
'93 L. Ed. 297 309 (1949).1 Ibid.
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gifts was founded upon a specific provision in the Revenue Act of May 28, 1938.
The sections pertinent to the question in this case were 22 (a) and 22 (b)." The
Court determined that the particular gains in question came within the definition
of gross income as set out in 22 (a). The circuit court had also reached this
conclusion, but had saved the taxpayer harmless from the tax by an additional
finding that this specific gain was excluded from gross income by 22 (b) (3),
which made the value of property acquired by gift not subject to the income tax.
The Supreme Court held that such a result was not intended by the Congress,
and in support of its position made an examination of section 22 (b) and its
amendments. Section 22 (b) (9), a 1937 amendment to 22 (b), dealt with m-
come from discharge of indebtedness represented by a security of a corporation,
and provided, in substance, that where a corporation received income from the
discharge of such indebtedness it could, upon certification to the Commissioner
that the taxpayer was at the time of such discharge in an unsound financial condi-
tion, and if it would also agree to comply with the terms of section 113 (b) (3),
such income would not be included in gross income. Section 113 (b) (3) re-
quired the taxpayer to apply the amount excluded from gross income under 22
(b) (9) to the reduction of the basis of any property held by the taxpayer during
any portion of the taxable year in which such discharge occurred."
The Court reasoned that if 22 (b) (3) was the proper section into which
these cases of income from discharge of indebtedness should fall, as was advocated
by the court of appeals, then there would be no need for this 22 (b) (9) amend-
ment. Furthermore, as the status of corporations and natural persons is not dif-
ferentiated in section 22 (a), the new amendments made it clear that inasmuch
as they pertain to corporation only in this sort of case, it must be that natural
persons in similar cases remain taxable under 22 (a). Another factor used by the
court in its argument was that these amendments were only for a temporary period.
This indicated to the court, that for its permanent program, Congress regarded
such gains as properly taxable and that the amendments were intended to authorize
temporary changes in policy, and were not clarifications of existing or continuing
policies. The Court concluded that these amendments describe gains correspond-
ing almost exactly with those derived by the respondent from his purchases in
the instant case. The Court then observed that as the amendments pertained
only to complying corporations, and not to natural persons, petitioner was not
included within section 22 (b) (9) and therefore was subject to the tax un-
der 22 (a).
This case, though similar on its facts to the Dental Co. case, reached a directly
opposite result. Three Justices in the Jacobson case were of the opimon that the
majority had done a poor job of distinguishing the Dental Co. case, and in effect,
had overruled it."
A comparison of the two decisions leads the writer to agree with the dissent.
In the Dental Co. case the taxpayer was a corporation, and in the instant case
Jacobson was a private individual. It is admitted that this would be an important
distinction were both cases decided today because of the provisions of section
'7 93 L. Ed. 297, 301 and n. 2 and 3.
'INT. REv. CODE sec. 22 (b) (9) and sec. 113 (b) (3); Revenue Act of 1939, sec.
215, 53 STAT. 862, 875, 876.
1" 93 L. Ed. 297 309 (1949).
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22 (b) (9) outlined above. However, when the Dental Co. case was decided
section 22 (b) (9) had no application because its provisions were applicable only
to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1938.' Therefore no distinction
can be drawn between the two cases on that basis. Another difference might be
drawn between the two cases on the ground that in the Jacobson case the debtor
did not deal directly with the creditors in all cases, as was done in the Dental Co.
case. The fallacy in this argument is that the majority of the Court itself con-
ceded that there was no difference between personal contact in face-to-face
transactions and in bargaining through agents, as long as the creditors had knowl-
edge that the real buyer was his debtor. The last basis upon which a distinction
nught be drawn between the two cases is on the nature of the indebtedness in-
volved in them. The Supreme Court seized upon this difference and held that in
the Jacobson case the idea that a bondholder would agree to sell part of his bond
and give the other part to the debtor was ridiculous; yet in the same set of facts,
except for a bondholder there is substituted a noteholder, the court was emphatic
in its opinion that the transaction amounted to a gift. That these two lines of
reasoning are contradictory is shown by quotations from the two cases. In the
Dental Co. case the Court supported the transaction of debt reduction as a gift by
declaring: "The fact that the motives leading to the cancellation were those of
business or even selfish, if it be true, is not significant. The forgiveness was gra-
tuitous, a release of something to the debtor for nothing, and sufficient to make
the cancellation here gifts within the statute."' The same court, speaking in the
Jacobson case said, of the same question, "It is conceivable, although hardly likely,
that a bondholder, might have sold part of his claims on the bonds he held
at the full face value of those parts and then have made a gift of the rest of his
claims on those bonds to the same debtor 'for nothing. It is that kind of extra-
ordinary transaction that the respondent asks us, as a matter of law, to read into
the simple sales which actually took place and from which lie derived financial
gains." 2-
Notice that in the first case the motives of the creditors were not significant,
while in the latter case the motives of the creditor were the bases of the court's
decision.
With this last possible distinction between the two cases invalidated, the con-
clusion is inevitable that the nunority of the court was correct in its opinion that
Helvenng v. American Dental Co. has been overruled by Commissioner v.
Jacabson.
A. SiNGLETON CAGLE
"318 U. S. 322, 329 (1942).
"318 U. S. 322, 331 (1942).
-93 L. Ed. 297 309 (1949).
